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Introduction 
 
 
Two main solutions have been proposed for the 'representation gap' that has grown in the 
UK with the decline in trade union recognition and density; union revitalisation and the 
development of alternative institutions for worker representation. Obviously there is 
much diversity within each category. Nonunion employee representation (NER) in 
principle can be categorised by type, according to whether its initiation is by an 
employer, the state or a voluntary organisation (Heery et al. 2004: 21-8). Debates on 
whether NER in some forms can replace trade unions and on whether it can complement 
unions and assist their revitalisation have been invigorated by the UK's transposition of 
the EU Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive. As regards the 
replacement thesis, Kim and Kim (2004) point out that the onus is on proponents to 
demonstrate that NER can perform traditional union functions as effectively as unions or 
can add something distinctive.  
 NER was not a major focus of UK industrial relations research until recently, for 
reasons discussed by Hall and Terry (2004). Public policy formerly relied on employee 
representation via the 'single channel' of trade unions voluntarily recognised by 
employers. NER was considered anomalous and its incidence was limited. It was most 
common in industries with structural characteristics associated with unionisation and 
consequently was assumed to be largely cosmetic, the employer's principal objective 
being union avoidance. The changed institutional industrial relations landscape, however, 
has generated a more differentiated set of views.  
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 One takes its inspiration from statutory works councils in north European states 
and proposes the arrangements can be emulated in other contexts, to provide a model of 
employee representation in the nonunion sector that is complementary to trade unions and 
supportive of employers' organisational efficiency objectives. The argument is that 
workers' representative participation in a company consultation structure assists 
employee-management communications, responsiveness and reciprocation. Workers are 
more receptive to workplace change because they feel their interests are represented and 
that the new management practices advantage them as well as employers (Rogers, 1999). 
This view is developed in the American literature on the 'mutual gains enterprise' 
(Kochan and Osterman, 1994) and is echoed by some among the pro-partnership 
lobbyists in the UK (e.g. IPA 1998).  
 A second view is sceptical that nonunion works councils and like arrangements 
can provide an effective substitute for trade unions in voluntarist and decentralised 
industrial relations regimes such as the UK's (Hall and Terry, 2004). NER lacks 'legally 
provided tools of bargaining power' (Kim and Kim, 2004: 1078) and is 'enterprise 
confined'. Without industrial action 'immunities' it cannot make credible threats of 
sanctions in support of employee demands, or even to hold management to its 
commitments to consult. Because nonunion employee representatives have not had legal 
protection from employer's victimisation they have been inclined towards caution. The 
provisions of the ICE Regulations may modify some among the limitations. But the 
conclusion is that effective employee representation in organisation-based consultation 
arrangements requires the support of strong trade unions that can provide 'expertise, co-
ordination and mobilising potential' (Terry, 1999:29). The issue, therefore, is how trade 
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unions can insert themselves into the workplace. The argument that statutory 
participation can assist unions in this respect is dismissed in a third view that regards 
works councils as a threat to union renewal, because they are conveyors of the 
'demobilising' ideology of partnership at work (Kelly, 1996).  
To date few studies have systematically compared employees' experiences of 
NER with union members' evaluation of their union representation. However statistical 
analyses of the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS98) data assess 
the effectiveness of different types of 'employee voice regime' in terms of employees' 
positive perceptions of managerial responsiveness; their proclivity for information 
sharing, employee consultation and the 'fair treatment' of employees. Bryson's (2004) 
analysis finds that nonunion representative voice and 'direct voice' ('two way' 
management direct employee communications) outperform union voice, in the terms 
considered. It also finds that the combination of NER and direct voice - identified in a 
mere 8 per cent of British workplaces in 1998 - is the only regime to outperform that of 
no employee voice (235).  
 The findings raise almost as many questions as the analysis set out to probe, as 
Bryson is the first to admit. Explanations for the apparent ineffectiveness of union voice 
have been suggested in terms of unions' success in mobilising members - raising their 
consciousness - so that they are more critical of management practices than nonunion 
employees (Guest and Conway, 2004). Of course, they may also be more exacting in 
their expectations of their representatives. Guest and Conway consider management's 
contribution, in terms of 'muffling' the union voice. Other analyses suggest how NER 
may be part of a 'bundle' of HRM practices combined to intensify management control 
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(Hall and Terry, 2004: 216); that is to say the aim is to structure employee attitudes and 
inculcate a 'consensus culture' based on the acceptance of management objectives.  
 NER has been compared with unions 'in general'. Yet unions have been advised to 
engage in change and one prescription is partnership with employers. An argument is that 
strong trade unions are better equipped than weak and compliant unions or NER to 
'coerce' management along the partnership 'high road' (Haynes and Allen, 2001). A 
contrasting logic is that partnership may be the only viable revitalisation strategy for 
unions weakened by two decades of industry restructuring, restrictive labour law and 
employer hostility (Ackers and Payne, 1998). The coercion in this case is from employers 
who, Ackers et al. (2005) argue, are reconstructing representative employee participation 
with or without union involvement in order to achieve their organisational efficiency 
objectives, or simply to accommodate new labour law. A third perspective warns that the 
putative employee voice gains of partnership are dwarfed by the large risks. Taylor and 
Ramsay (1998) discuss the potential for union incorporation in the management of 
workplace change that is experienced by employees as work intensification. Kelly (2005) 
highlights the danger of membership demobilisation resulting from the emphasis on 
shared labour-management interests. In other words, unions risk becoming more like 
NER in the eyes of their members and potential members and less able to perform 
traditional union functions (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2003).  
 This article explores the contrasting perspectives by comparing employees' 
evaluation of partnership practices at two organisations in the UK financial services. One 
had a nonunion 'partners' council' system of employee representation and the other had 
union recognition. After a brief discussion of the research design and an introduction to 
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the case study companies, the analysis compares employees' evaluation of their managers' 
performance in involving them in organisational decision-making and of the effectiveness 
of the representation available to them.  
 
Research Methods  
 
 
The research was conducted in 2002/3 as part of a project on 'patterns and prospects for 
partnership at work in the UK' funded by the ESRC under its Future of Work programme. 
The aims were to understand partnership as a social process, shaped by the interplay of 
relationships between firms, workers and their representation bodies, and to appreciate 
the meaning of partnership for employees. Quantitative and qualitative data were 
gathered for these purposes at each of the case study sites that numbered six in total. At 
the two financial services organisations semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
HR managers, senior and line managers, and with employee representatives as well as 
with employees. In total 40 interviews were completed at nonunion FinanceCo and 35 at 
unionised InsuranceCo. Their average duration was an hour. All interviews were tape 
recorded and transcribed. A questionnaire survey incorporating questions from WERS98 
was conducted among a sample of employees, constructed to reflect the principal 
occupational groups, at each case study site. This achieved a response rate of 128 
completed questionnaires among a sample of 400 employees at FinanceCo (a response 
rate of 32 per cent) and 129 useable returns at InsuranceCo among a workforce of 500 (a 
25 per cent response rate). At FinanceCo we were afforded the opportunity to observe 
meetings of the nonunion partners' council employee representation body.  
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Employee Representation in UK Financial Services  
 
 
The finance sector in the UK, as in other OECD countries, has been subject to a 
substantial restructuring of capital ownership, productive capacity and employment in the 
past two decades. Financial deregulation and the application of new information and 
communications technologies facilitated corporate strategies of diversification. Waves of 
merger and acquisition activity, coupled with efforts to engage front-office staff in the 
cross selling of financial products blurred the boundaries between the industry's sub-
sectors; banks and building societies, insurance and pension funding. The industry had 
1.1 million employee jobs at June 2005, 4.2 per cent of all employee jobs in the UK 
(ONS). Women’s share of employment increased and reached 60 per cent in the banks 
and building societies sector in the early 1990s. The administration and clerical grades in 
which women's jobs are concentrated, however, have become vulnerable to outsourcing 
and off-shoring.  
 The sector has a long history of employer-sponsored nonunion employee 
representation. TUC affiliated trade unions found it difficult, in particular, to expand in 
the fragmented building societies sector where staff associations proliferated in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Danford et al., 2003). There were similar developments in insurance, but the 
TUC-affiliated Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF) union had a long presence, 
formerly as ASTMS. Union density in financial intermediation was above 40 per cent at 
the start of the 1990s, but thereafter fell to around 26 per cent currently (ONS). TUC 
unions have had difficulty in extending membership in call centre operations and 
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sustaining it in the branch networks. There have been union opportunities as well as 
challenges. Job security was undermined from the early 1990s, new HRM performance 
management regimes were introduced in the drive for 'customer focus' and sales, and 
there has been work intensification. Mergers have been one union response to 
membership decline. The TUC affiliated Banking, Finance and Insurance Union (BIFU) 
allied with independent staff associations in 1999 to form UNIFI that in 2004 merged 
with AMICUS, that includes the MSF. The leadership of the 'super union' has been 
prepared on occasions to sanction industrial action in support of pay demands 
(Arrowsmith 2005). However, this is alongside the conclusion of partnership agreements 
with employers that persist with union recognition (Wills, 2004; Haynes and Allen 2001).  
 
 
The Case Study Companies  
 
 
Our research in 2002/3 was conducted at a demutualised building society, now owned by 
a bank headquartered outside the UK, and an insurance firm that is the UK head office of 
a European multinational insurance corporation. We refer to these as FinanceCo and 
InsuranceCo respectively. 
 
FinanceCo 
Under new ownership from the late 1990s, the corporate structure was divisionalised  
to make managers accountable for the profit or loss performance of separate business 
units. The product market strategy of 'customer relationship management' was 
accompanied by a drive for efficiency savings from work reorganisation, including the 
extension of call centre operations and generic work teams. HRM practices included 
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'market driven' and 'merit based' pay. Employment totaled 2,700 in 2002/3. A majority of 
staff worked in the consumer sales and service business unit (including the branch 
network), 800 were in the mortgage lending and processing business, and 300 in head 
office support.  
 The organisation had always been nonunion and before the 1990s had no 
provision for employee representation. An enlarged HR department, however, instituted 
the 'partners council' (PC) system from the early 1990s as a 'management alternative to 
trade unions' (manager interview). All employees (including managerial staff) were 
automatically PC members. Workplace constituencies of 30 to 35 employees elected (by 
individual ballot) a representative to a PC - there was a council for each business unit 
following divisionalisation - that met on a monthly basis. PC chairs met thereafter as a 
separate group. Their constitution provided 'rights' to be informed and consulted by 
management, principally about HR matters.  
 Managers argued their practices had become more pluralist over the 1990s. In 
instituting the PC system their aim initially had been to promote 'partnership and 
teamwork', the template being the John Lewis 'employee partnership'. The emphasis in 
the second half of the 1990s had shifted to 'employee representation and involvement' 
(HR manager interview) as the means of enlisting employees' commitment and 
cooperation with workplace change. An influence was the anticipation of labour law 
change under the incoming Labour government. PC representatives were sponsored 
through employment law training so they could become involved in representing 
employees in grievance and disciplinary cases. This complemented a principal 
management objective for the PC system, union avoidance. Thus while there were 
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managers who saw the system as a step towards the 'democratisation' of the workplace, 
its value for them was that it was 'not a trade union with an agenda independent of the 
company's' (manager interview). Their anxiety was whether employees regarded it as 
anything more than a 'talking shop'.  
 UNIFI had members in the branch network and from the end of the 1990s was 
targeting FinanceCo as potentially vulnerable under the new government's proposed 
statutory union recognition procedure. Management's response was to pre-empt further 
external involvement by organising a workforce ballot on union recognition, conducted 
under independent scrutiny. Employees were asked whether they wanted union 
recognition or representation via a PC system with greater authority. While a majority 
favoured the latter around a third of the votes cast were for union recognition. The PC 
system was re-launched with a full-time officer role, a management commitment to 
extend the scope of consultation to business as well as HR matters and to consult at an 
earlier stage in the decision-making process. In addition the company's chief executive 
applied his authority and, in the words of one HR manager, 'almost ordered line managers 
to take the partners councils seriously'.  
 
 
InsuranceCo 
The core business was a niche insurance market but the company diversified in the 1990s 
into the uninsured loss recovery (ULR) trade. A new office was opened and in 2003 
employed 120 staff. Total employment increased to 500. The workforce included brokers, 
professionally qualified solicitors who staffed a legal advice service for claimants, 
administrative staff and call-centre operatives. As at FinanceCo, women comprised two 
thirds of the employment total. And, as at FinanceCo, managers were pursuing efficiency 
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savings and restructuring performance management systems. In 2002/3 pay bands were 
being displaced by competency-based pay determined through individual appraisal.  
 MSF, now AMICUS, had been recognised since the 1970s for the purpose of 
negotiating pay and conditions. Union density was around 80 per cent at the start of the 
1990s but fell thereafter. Union representatives attributed this to the expansion of 
employment and recruitment of individuals socialised in the Thatcher era. Few mentioned 
the legal proscription of closed shop agreements, although this would seem to have 
contributed. At the end of the 1990s management had sought and the union accepted a 
'collaborative' relationship. The written agreement asserted that 'changes necessary to 
maintain or improve the Company's commercial success are a joint concern of managers 
and staff'. Management committed to provide 'the greatest possible stability of 
employment and earnings' and the union to 'cooperate fully in the implementation of 
measures designed to sustain or increase efficiency or profitability'.  
 As at FinanceCo, there were management concerns about the adequacy of the 
employee representation arrangements. Union density fluctuated around 45 per cent. Two 
issues had become intertwined. Did reliance on the single channel of union representation 
remain an effective management approach? Would it be adequate once the EU ICE 
Directive was enacted? There was a European Works Council at the level of the parent 
organisation but no local consultation forum inclusive of all employees. HR managers 
discussed the logic for retaining the extant arrangements in terms of the legitimacy that 
the union's involvement conferred in the management of change. As one argued: 
 
Because if you want to get through change, let's say in terms of contract, say we 
want to change the shift patterns, it's much better to get the unions on board, to 
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get them to help us through that change and then, having agreed with them, then 
it's binding on the whole company whether they're members or not.  
 
Formal union-management meetings were held each quarter. The scope of the 
employment and HR issues considered in these and more ad hoc meetings expanded; an 
HR manager argued that the unions were now involved, or consulted, on all such matters. 
A range of direct channels of communication with employees was also in place, 
ostensibly matching the partnership commitment to transparency through information 
sharing.  
 
 
Employees' Voice: Involvement at Work?  
 
 
Partnership theory proposes that indirect and direct employee participation can be 
integrated to achieve an enhanced voice in organisational decision-making for employees 
that translates, for the employer, into a more committed and productive workforce. Direct 
employee participation includes direct communications that may be one-way, downwards 
from management, or provide some scope for employees to present their views to 
management. It is the latter, two-way communications that Bryson (2004) includes as 
'direct voice' in his analysis of the WERS98 data testing the effectiveness of different 
employee voice regimes in terms of employees' positive perceptions of managerial 
responsiveness; their proclivity for information-sharing and employee consultation. Our 
questionnaire included the relevant WERS98 employee survey questions and also asked 
employees to rate managers' performance in involving them in organisational decision-
making.  
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 Each of the case study organisations practised downwards communications; the 
use of notice-boards, staff magazines, intranet and email systems. Each had two-way 
communications schemes; team briefing systems that provided employee 'question time', 
employee attitude surveys, focus groups, opportunities for staff to quiz senior managers, 
and face to face staff appraisals. There were important differences in the ways in which 
the two companies managed these communications systems and attempted to integrate 
them with the arrangements for employees' indirect participation in decision-making. The 
employee interview and survey data nevertheless showed substantial similarities in the 
employees' experience. The survey responses are compared in Table 1. While a third of 
respondents at each organisation thought managers poor or very poor at keeping people 
up to date about proposed changes, employees were more likely to feel they were 
informed than they were to feel they were involved in decision-making.  
 
 
    Table 1 – about here  
 
 
FinanceCo  
Managers suggested they used direct communications in a structured and purposeful way. 
In the process they made it clear that they viewed the PC system of employee 
representation as among the channels for relaying information to employees about 
decisions managers had made.  
 
Decisions are made by the decision makers who are usually the management 
team. … The proposal, when it's ready for launch, goes first of all to the Partners' 
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Council or the chair of the Partners' Council and almost at the same time … it 
goes to the people affected, so they are all brought in for a face to face briefing … 
They in turn are given guidelines as to how to it is to roll out to their staff. That's 
the commitment bit. Staff are given a hard copy or can access it from the intranet 
and then give feedback. … either through the intranet, they can go to their 
Partners' Council representative, or they can come to line management and HR. 
(HR manager). 
 
There was evidently an aim of creating consent for the management agenda. Yet many of 
the employees we interviewed were frustrated by the practices entailed.  
 The sheer volume of information targeted at them or made available to them was 
overwhelming.  
 
I think the organisation is trying to communicate but it's quite a fine balance 
between giving you enough information and enough relevant information and just 
kind of like splattering the information. (Female administrator, consumer sales) 
 
Some employees were satisfied they were being involved through team meetings, team 
briefings and the 'fun days' or 'commitment days' organised by departmental managers. 
Many others were satisfied simply that they had opportunities 'to moan' or to ask 
questions, and some were cynical of management objectives.  
 
You see they have lots of fluffy language going on at the moment … So they have 
objectives like 'having fun', saying it is an open company, but then that all goes 
basically to profit, doesn't it? The whole point of having that is to get the kind of 
atmosphere in the workplace where we're going to get most profit. … but that is 
touchy-feely profit. (Female professional, mortgages). 
 
Three criticisms of management practices recurred in the employee interviewees. The 
first was that team meetings and briefings centred narrowly on immediate operational 
issues. The second was the doubt that staff views were relayed back up the management 
hierarchy. Indeed, some felt their line manager's chief objective was to keep staff 
 15
motivated by not explaining the pressures for higher performance they themselves were 
under.  
 
I think we've been protected a bit from what's being expected of our team leaders 
and the management. Basically we just get the OK, that you're needed to do this, 
hit these targets and sales. I'm not sure what their priority is supposed to be and 
why they are asking us for this or how much pressure they are under over it. 
(Female clerical worker, mortgages).  
 
Finally, employees felt that line managers were not receptive to questioning about 
particular issues, central to staff concerns, such as pay or how performance targets were 
established. 
 
Those sorts of things we just don't get involved in. I probably wouldn't feel 
confident in asking that, to be honest. There's some things people have said. It 
doesn't feel like they're particularly open to that sort of thing. (Female clerical 
worker, customer sales). 
 
 
InsuranceCo  
HR managers were candid about an elision between the formal, ‘open communications’ 
policy and current practice. Authority had been devolved to departmental managers, to 
'run the department in the best way they think fit' and staff communications was not 
always a priority. The HR department had made its own innovations, however, including 
the appointment of a 'dedicated' communications officer whose role was to disseminate 
information - about the business and HR matters - to the workforce as a whole. A stated 
aim was that of catering for the nonunion section of the workforce. Yet the initiative 
instigated a dualistic arrangement that managers could use selectively. For example, the 
union had been informed about the major overhaul of the performance management 
system in 2002, while management used a focus group exercise to persuade employees of 
the benefits of the new pay and appraisal system.  
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 Most employee interviewees thought they received adequate information about 
the business. Much of this was by email and for workers in the geographically separate 
ULR business in particular, reinforced the idea that senior managers were remote and of 
the view that:  
 
they make decisions and we're here to abide by them rather than, perhaps, "let's 
discuss them and then implement them" (Female administrator, ULR business).  
 
As at FinanceCo, employees felt team briefings were largely to focus attention on local 
performance targets. Survey participants were less likely than their FinanceCo 
counterparts to feel they had opportunity to comment on proposed changes (Table 1). 
Arrangements for gathering staff 'feedback' were less highly structured than at 
FinanceCo. On the other hand, InsuranceCo employees were the more likely to feel that 
managers responded to their suggestions, even though only 51 per cent of survey 
participants were of this view. The survey showed some differences in union and 
nonunion members' evaluation of management, but there was no consistent pattern. 
Union members were not invariably the most critical. 
 
 
Indirect Participation: influence in workplace management?  
 
 
FinanceCo's PC system offered all employees representation in a consultation forum. The 
union at InsuranceCo was the single channel for collective consultation and negotiation 
on some issues; union-management agreements applied universally, across the workforce 
as a whole. Obviously for any indirect participation arrangement to serve its purpose 
there needs to be accountability between representatives and the represented. We begin 
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with this issue and then compare PC members' and union members' evaluation of their 
indirect influence in workplace management.  
 
 
Representatives and members 
 
FinanceCo. All surveyed employees reported they were aware of the PC system and 97 
per cent indicated they knew the identity of their representative. This impressively high 
level of awareness might perhaps have been anticipated; management had invested effort 
and organisational resources to make the PC system salient to employees, as an 
alternative to union representation.  
 Most survey respondents (82 per cent) agreed that their representatives expressed 
their views in the PC. Yet the finding needs to be considered with other insights, from the 
interview data. Many employees thought it could be difficult to get volunteers to stand 
for election as PC representatives. The company provided facilities, including time off. 
But individuals had to have sufficient interest to assume the role, or regard it as 
complementary to career development. Among the representatives we interviewed, some 
had actively sought office. Others had been encouraged by their line manager to stand, if 
only because there was a shortfall of volunteers and line managers were under pressure 
from their managers to make the employee representation system 'work', which meant 
ensuring it was staffed. 
 Representatives clearly took the role seriously, in the sense of being assiduous in 
their efforts to report back to constituents and to elicit views. Much of the communication 
was by email, so employees were informed and consulted individually. A majority among 
the survey participants thought representatives good at communicating with members 
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(Table 2). Representatives, however, complained that employees were not interested in 
PC activities. The following was a typical comment.  
I'd like to see ordinary people actually getting involved more and participating 
more, giving me feedback more, because it's a bit like pulling teeth. For example, 
there are about eight policies up for review this quarter. I've alerted my 
constituents to the fact that these HR policies are up for review and do they have 
any issues, feedback, comments? And nothing has come back.  
 
Some representatives argued that employees were insufficiently aware of the potential 
influence the PC could exert. The more common interpretation, however, was that 
employees' apparent apathy reflected a measured evaluation of the PC’s limited remit and 
influence in organisational decision-making. 
 
InsuranceCo at the time of our research had no UK consultation forum inclusive of the 
nonunion workforce. There was a European Works Council. A majority of surveyed 
employees (58 per cent) were aware of its existence. Only a minority (41 per cent), 
however, professed to know the identity of their representative, and consequently a 
majority (53 per cent) 'did not know' if their views were represented. The UK rep emailed 
updates about the EWC, but the staff interviews suggested that the agenda of items was 
rather remote from employees' concerns. 
 Senior managers valued the cooperative relationship they had with union 
representatives and argued that they did what they could to support union joining. For 
example, newly recruited employees were asked if their contact details could be passed to 
the union. However, management's interest in working with the union was the legitimacy 
conferred on management decisions, and not all union activity was regarded as functional 
in these terms. HR managers made it clear that they monitored the facilities agreement 
and the amount of time representatives spent on union work in the workplace.  
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 A majority of union members included in the survey (55 per cent) thought the 
union good at communicating with members (Table 2). Yet many among those 
interviewed thought the union was remote, and the grievance was most pronounced at the 
ULR business where union meetings apparently were a rare event. A general complaint 
was the lack of opportunity to be actively involved in the union.  
 
We don't ever get told, the union aren't forever banging their drum. I don't hear 
any of that at all. So we don't get monthly updates or anything like that. So you 
just pay your dues and then hopefully the union are there if you need them. 
(Female administrator, head office).  
 
 
 
Table 2 – about here  
 
 
 
Influence in Workplace Management  
 
FinanceCo staff representatives typically compared the PC with trade union 
representation, or their understanding of what that might entail. In the process they 
divided between PC advocates and sceptics. Advocates included individuals who thought 
unions 'too political' and others with a vested interest in the success of FinanceCo's 
homegrown alternative. For the latter, it was the PC's consensual orientation that gave it a 
'competitive advantage' over trade union representation, although it would seem the 
appeal was aimed more at management than employees. One representative argued that:  
 
… if you take the viewpoint that you are purely here to do what the staff want, 
regardless of whether it's good for the company or not, then ultimately we are 
going to be seen as obstructive and therefore they might as well have a union 
because what's the difference? 
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Sceptics thought the PC lacked the credibility of a trade union and as a result was of 
limited interest to employees. First, it was limited to consultation and had few sanctions 
to hold management to the commitment to consult. To quote one representative it was 'a 
union that has no teeth'. Second, although the scope of consultation had increased, 
discussion of the distributive issues that might be thought of central interest to employees 
- pay, employment terms and conditions - was still largely precluded. For one 
representative this was the root cause of the 'awful lot of apathy generally from staff 
towards the partners’ council'. Third, representatives complained that the PC dealt largely 
with 'housekeeping issues' and issues of concern to the HR department, and that on 
important matters management had made 'a lot of the key decisions … before they get to 
the partners council and they ask for our input'. The final and overarching criticism was 
that the system was not independent from management.  
 
… although it's written in the policies and so forth that we are an autonomous 
party, we're not really that autonomous because management can interfere in a lot 
of things … 
 
An example was the HR department's insistence on vetting the short-list of candidates for 
the full-time officer role. Managers had staff representatives whose presence in the PC, 
many interviewees felt, dissuaded employees from voicing grievances. A professional 
head office worker, for example, argued that 'I think you really have to trust your 
partners' council rep. to not do you an injustice when representing you'.  
 In the interviews and questionnaire survey employees were found to be largely 
sceptical of the PC's influence. The survey findings are summarised in Table 3. A bare 3 
per cent of respondents felt the partners' council had a lot of influence over pay. Only a 
third (38 per cent) thought it had influence over working conditions. And since less than 
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half (48 per cent) of respondents thought the PC was taken seriously by management it is 
not surprising that only a third (36 per cent) thought it 'made a difference to what it is like 
to work here'. Perhaps the most damning criticism was the comment of one among the 
clerical workers interviewed who thought the PC was 'some sort of suggestion scheme'.  
 
Table 3 – about here  
 
InsuranceCo had union recognition, negotiated pay and had forged a cooperation 
agreement that ostensibly made the union a partner in the management of workplace 
change. Union members had greater confidence in their representatives’ influence in 
workplace management than FinanceCo employees had of their nonunion PC, as is 
shown by the comparison of the survey findings in Table 3. However, on some measures 
the contrast was marked principally because of the limited faith PC members had in the 
influence wielded by their representation body.  
 That less than a third of InsuranceCo union members (29 per cent) thought the 
union had a lot of influence on pay perhaps is not surprising in a period of low price 
inflation. Nonetheless there were union members at InsuranceCo who felt their 
representatives too willing to compromise in negotiations with management, while union 
representatives argued - somewhat fatalistically - that pay was now determined from 
abroad, by the parent company. The main point, however, is that the union's positive 
response to the company's invitation to cooperate in workplace change had not given a 
fillip to the union's perceived influence and the most obvious reason is that employees 
had experienced workplace change as benefiting principally the company. They had 
conceded flexibility in working time and tasks, and two thirds of all employees surveyed 
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felt their work had been intensified in recent years whilst annual pay settlements had been 
modest.  
 Most union members included in the survey (78 per cent) believed that the union 
was taken seriously by management. This was a clear contrast with the way in which 
FinanceCo PC members viewed their nonunion representation body. The PC suffered 
from its perceived lack of independence from management. The union at InsuranceCo 
was not handicapped in this way but it struggled to convince members and potential 
members that its cooperative stance was reciprocated by influence in management. Only 
46 per cent of union members in the employee survey thought the union made much 
difference to 'what it is like to work here'; a third (31 per cent) were undecided on the 
issue.  
 
Representation at work 
 
 
FinanceCo. A majority of employees voted in 2001 to retain the PC system, although in 
the knowledge that it was their managers’ preference and on the understanding that its 
influence would be strengthened. Many of the staff representatives interviewed in 2002/3 
argued that in practice little had changed, and our research found that employees in 
general were not convinced the PC had influence in management or were confident it 
could perform other representation functions. 
 The PC was prohibited from negotiating pay. And since pay had been 
individualised and made dependent on performance, as assessed at an individual appraisal 
by line management, it is not surprising that most surveyed employees thought they 
themselves or their line manager their best representation in securing a pay increase 
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(Table 4). Relatively few surveyed employees (29 per cent) felt that PC representation 
was their best option for resolving a work-related grievance. As discussed earlier, its 
efficacy as a channel for voicing employee grievances was compromised by employee 
fears that their identity - as complainants - would become obvious to managers who were 
represented in the PC, or had access to the minutes. Indeed some staff representatives 
argued that in the current, relatively buoyant labour market employees were more likely 
to quit than attempt to secure redress for their grievances through the PC. The company 
sponsored staff representatives' employment law training, so that staff representation in 
individual grievance and disciplinary proceedings could be handled in house. Yet there 
were managers who doubted that staff representatives had the confidence or expertise for 
the task and clearly many employees felt similarly. Only 29 per cent of survey 
respondents felt PC representation their best option, in the event of facing disciplinary 
action from managers.  
 
Table 4 – around here  
 
 
 
InsuranceCo. Union members believed the union was taken seriously by management 
which in a sense was the case; its in situ presence meant it could not be ignored. Yet 
union members did not perceive their representatives as having great sway in workplace 
management; they did not see its cooperative stance being reciprocated by management. 
They were more confident than their counterparts at FinanceCo in their representation 
body's ability to perform traditional union functions. That said, the union had acquiesced 
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in the pay reforms introduced in 2002/3, that threatened greater individualisation of 
reward, and in the employee survey two fifths of union members felt self-representation 
rather than union representation their best option for gaining a pay increase (Table 4).  
 Workplace union representatives explained that much of their union work was 
about individual advocacy; organising in the workplace was not mentioned frequently.  
Many managers affirmed the union's effectiveness. Line managers complained that union 
representatives were overly zealous in advocating the employee's case. HR managers, in 
contrast, valued the union's services in helping to resolve what might otherwise be 
difficult and protracted disciplinary proceedings. Among union members were those who 
referred to representatives being on hand to 'fight for you' and 'do everything they can' for 
individuals in trouble at work, and 83 per cent included in the survey thought union 
representation their best option in the event of facing disciplinary action from 
management. Yet the problem for the union was convincing the majority of the 
workforce of the benefits of subscribing for such support.  
 Nonunion members included those who had resigned from the union and the 
larger number who had never joined. Many who were interviewed argued that the union 
did not appear to make a difference, or a sufficient difference, to make union joining 
worthwhile or worth the cost. But they divided between those who felt the union did not 
address their needs and others who professed to feel sufficiently secure to not need the 
union. There were some in both groups who admitted they were 'free riders', enjoying 
union services - including the assurance of having a union to hand in the event of a 
problem at work - without paying subs.  
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Well, things they do like negotiating for paid paternity leave. I benefit from that 
anyway. I don't have to be a member for them to negotiate that. They negotiate 
that as a staff benefit. (Female technician, head office).  
 
Union density fluctuated with peaks achieved at times of crisis. For example, there had 
been redundancies at the ULR business in 2002, notwithstanding the 'job security' 
provisions of the union-management cooperation agreement. This had activated the latent 
demand for union representation; the union was reported to have gained members. Yet 
the problem was one of sustaining such membership 'surges' and retaining in the union 
the recent recruits. An active workplace union presence, orientated towards union 
organising, was required but was constrained not least by managers' conscientious 
application of the union facilities agreement.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Partnership has been the dominant refrain in proposed solutions for the 'representation 
gap', certainly in the management literature as in public policy. Its theory suggests that 
workplace democracy and business efficiency can be advanced symbiotically and through 
an integration of direct and indirect employee participation. This article compared 
employee evaluations of partnership practices at two organisations in the UK financial 
services with nonunion and union representation respectively. It showed the similarity of 
the employees' experience was their felt lack of 'empowerment'. Many employees at both 
organisations felt controlled rather than involved by the profusion of management 
schemes for communicating directly with them, since the central message was the need to 
cooperate with organisational performance targets. In general, neither FinanceCo's PC 
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members nor union members at InsuranceCo thought their representation body exerted 
much influence in management, although the reasons differed.  
 The PC was a management construct, instituted with three main objectives: to 
achieve employee commitment to corporate goals, accommodate legal obligations, and to 
sustain union avoidance. Because it was not seen as independent or relevant, however, 
employees in general were not interested in its affairs. Its agenda was dominated by the 
HR department that regarded the PC as an adjunct to other 'two way' means of 
communicating company priorities to staff. Its composition did not inspire employee 
confidence that grievances could be voiced without retribution. 
 Union density had fallen at InsuranceCo but insufficiently for the union's 
'presence' to be ignored. The management strategy was to include the union in a 
cooperation pact as the means of managing workplace change. This was a largely one-
way exchange of moderation on the union's part. Coerced by inter-firm competition and 
the need to achieve 'added value' from the workforce, the company was unable to 
concede union influence in the traditional bargaining agenda or beyond it. Indeed, the 
new performance management system limited the union to negotiating the distribution of 
the 'pay pot'.  
 Union members in general remained committed to union representation although 
were not uncritical of their union leadership. Workplace representatives were considered 
insufficiently assertive - as opposed to incorporated - and remote so that members' 
involvement was passive. The union's resources and orientation towards organising, 
however, were constrained by the cooperation agreement. Nonunion employees by and 
large valued the union's presence as insurance. Some felt comfortably situated not to need 
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representation. Others articulated a 'frustrated demand' (Bryson, 2003) for effective 
representation. That is to say while they wanted redress for grievances - as regards pay, 
workloads, equality of opportunity, management style - they did not think the gains from 
union membership proportionate to the charges.  
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Table 1. Employees' Assessment of the Extent of Direct Communications and Involvement 
(FinanceCo, n = 128: InsuranceCo, n = 129)   
 
 very good 
(%) 
Good 
(%) 
Poor 
(%) 
very poor 
(%) 
Undecided 
(%) 
How good are your managers at keeping everyone up to date about proposed changes at work? 
FinanceCo 9 49 30 6 6 
InsuranceCo 6 50 32 6 6 
   Union members 4 51 36 2 7 
   Non members  8 49 28 10 5 
How good are your managers at providing the chance to comment on changes?  
FinanceCo 6 52 28 7 7 
InsuranceCo 3 42 43 5 7 
   Union members 0 40 45 6 9 
   Non members  5 43 42 4 6 
How good are your managers at responding to suggestions from employees?  
FinanceCo 3 39 37 11 10 
InsuranceCo 5 46 34 2 13 
   Union members 2 51 32 4 11 
   Non members  7 42 35 1 15 
How good are your managers at involving employees in decision making?  
FinanceCo 5 37 40 6 12 
InsuranceCo 6 39 38 7 10 
   Union members 9 38 38 6 9 
   Non members  3 40 38 8 11 
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Table 2. Employees' evaluation of  contact with and communication from partners' council/trade 
union representatives. (FinanceCo, n = 128: InsuranceCo, n = 129)   
 
 
 Frequent 
(%) 
Occasional 
(%) 
Never 
(%) 
I am a 
representative 
(%) 
representative 
not known 
(%) 
How frequently do you have contact with representatives about workplace matters? 
FinanceCo 29 45 20 5 1 
InsuranceCo 3 27 58 2 10 
   Union members 6 46 46 2 0 
   Non members  1 13 68 0 18 
 Strongly 
agree 
(%) 
Agree 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(%) 
Undecided 
(%) 
'the partners' council/trade union here is good at communicating with members'? 
FinanceCo 8 72 6 3 11 
InsuranceCo 5 37 16 1 41 
   Union members 11 44 20 4 21 
   Non members  0 31 12 1 56 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Employees' assessment of partners' council/trade union influence at the workplace. 
(FinanceCo, n = 128: InsuranceCo, n = 127) 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
(%) 
Agree 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(%) 
Undecided 
(%) 
The partners' council/trade union has a lot of influence over pay 
FinanceCo 0 3 42 32 23 
InsuranceCo 4 18 31 7 40 
   Union members 8 21 38 7 26 
   Non members  1 16 26 9 48 
The partners' council/trade union has a lot of influence over working conditions  
FinanceCo 3 35 32 10 20 
InsuranceCo 5 29 25 1 40 
   Union members 11 35 30 4 20 
   Non members  0 23 21 1 55 
The partner's council/trade union is taken seriously by management 
FinanceCo 2 46 22 9 21 
InsuranceCo 7 52 9 1 31 
   Union members 11 67 4 2 16 
   Non members  4 40 13 1 42 
The  partners' council/trade union makes a difference to what it is like to work here  
FinanceCo 2 34 31 7 26 
InsuranceCo 6 31 20 3 40 
   Union members 13 33 19 4 31 
   Non members  0 29 23 3 45 
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Table 4. Employees' evaluation of who best represents them (FinanceCo, n = 128: InsuranceCo, n = 
129)   
 
FINANCECO Myself 
(%) 
partners council 
(%) 
line manager 
(%) 
undecided 
(%) 
Who do you think would best represent you if you want to gain a pay increase? 
 
33 10 49 8 
 Myself 
(%) 
Partners council 
(%) 
Trade Union 
(%) 
Undecided 
(%) 
Who do you think would best represent you if you have a work-related grievance?  
 
43 29 14 14 
Who do you think would best represent you if a manager wanted to discipline you?  
 
38 29 15 18 
INSURANCECO Myself 
(%) 
Trade Union 
(%) 
Another 
employee 
(%) 
Someone else 
(%) 
Who do you think would best represent you if you want to gain a pay increase? 
All respondents 62 30 5 3 
Union members 43 50 6 1 
Non members  77 15 4 4 
Who do you think would best represent you if you have a work-related grievance?  
All respondents 57 32 6 5 
Union members 37 52 5 6 
Non members  72 17 7 4 
Who do you think would best represent you if a manager wanted to discipline you? 
All respondents 43 47 6 4 
Union members 13 83 0 4 
Non members  61 24 11 4 
 
